Il portale GoEuro.it, che ha redatto l’Indice dei Prezzi della Birra 2015, una delle tante classifiche utili a capire il costo della vita e che fornisce informazioni interessanti per il viaggiatore in prossimità delle imminenti vacanze estive, non ha preso MALTA in considerazione, MALTA è spesso dimenticata da molte classifiche internazionali.
I dati riferiti a giugno 2015 rilevati da Numbeo nel mondo, fanno di Malta una tra le prime destinazioni del mondo anche per questa classifica
L’Indice dei Prezzi della Birra 2015 prende in considerazione 75 città in 5 continenti e paragona i prezzi delle 5 birre d’importazione più popolari a confronto con le birre locali maggiormente consumate. Il prezzo considerato è quello del consumo al bar e dell’acquisto presso il supermercato.
Alcune curiosità: il podio è composto da tre città dell’Est Europa, in ordine Cracovia appunto, Kiev e Bratislava mentre fra le città italiane compaiono in classifica Venezia, la prima “tricolore” al 45° posto, Milano, posizionata al 57° posto e Roma in 64-esima posizione. Il prezzo della birra nel 2015 ha subito delle variazioni rispetto al 2014 dovute all’inflazione o alla svalutazione monetaria. Per esempio, a causa della drammatica sopravvalutazione del Franco Svizzero rispetto all’Euro, Zurigo e Ginevra sono entrambe tra le 15 città più care dove acquistare birra sorpassando la capofila dell’anno scorso, Oslo. Analogamente le città statunitensi sono diventate più care rispetto al 2014 in seguito all’indebolimento dell’Euro rispetto al Dollaro.
Taking away the power of countries to devalue their currency could make them more responsible and their competitiveness capacities much more clear.
It’s almost a truism to say that membership in the euro exacerbated the Greek crisis. The thinking goes like this: Because Greece doesn’t have its own currency, it couldn’t increase its competitiveness and boost growth through devaluation. Although devaluation is a valuable instrument, I think most countries and companies would benefit if the world, not just Europe, used a single currency.
Today’s fragmented financial world is unfair. On the one hand, there’s Denmark with such a glut of currency, local and foreign, that its central bank’s key deposit rate is minus 0.75 percent and companies are considering overpaying their taxes because the Tax Ministry pays 1 percent interest on the excess. Then there’s Greece, which has had to limit withdrawals from automated teller machines to 60 euros a day because of a severe cash crunch.
Consider the case of Apple, with an enormous cash pile that earns next to nothing. The company had about $160 billion in March 2014 and made $1.795 billion in interest and dividend income that year — which is less than 1 percent, considering that the company’s kept increasing the cash holding. And there are companies, even entire countries, that would kill to be financed at that rate — but are forced to accept much higher ones, and not necessarily because they are unsafe borrowers, but because they are often dragged down by risk perceptions that have little to do with reality.
Before the 2008 financial crisis, financial globalization — defined as international capital inflows — was on the rise, partly because investors underestimated risk. After the mortgage crash, it became clear that rating agencies weren’t much help to investors in making such estimates and that local and specialized knowledge was needed to make intelligent decisions. The European debt crisis only confirmed this. Cross-border investment fell off sharply:
Despite all the talk of globalization and its harmful effects, money doesn’t wander the world looking for opportunities. Mainly, it stays at home. Even some of the recorded international flows are in fact domestic investment made through offshore havens for tax purposes. No wonder direct investment is the most stable component of cross-border capital movements: Companies and individuals investing in specific projects do their homework on a micro level, so they probably have the best information.
Generally, though, the fiscal regimes, political and macroeconomic risks of countries vary so much that mistakes happen, even when a foreign investor can afford detailed and knowledgeable analysis. The bond guru Michael Hasenstab’s investment in Ukrainian bonds for Franklin Templeton is a case in point: The trade was thoroughly analyzed and Hasenstab traveled to Kiev last year to talk to officials and executives, but the country now wants him to accept a 40 percent haircut as part of its International Monetary Fund-led bailout.
To ensure that financial resources are distributed more evenly throughout the world, it would make sense to cut down country-specific risk. Taking monetary policy out of individual countries’ hands would go a long way toward that goal. Currency risk would be eliminated — the same monetary unit would be in use everywhere — and there would be a uniform interest rate environment. The creditworthiness of specific borrowers would be investors’ biggest area of concern. That’s still a big unknown, and there would always be enough coups, revolutions, corruption, fraud and mismanagement to throw the best models off kilter. Yet there would be much less to worry about.
Now, the world’s 140 or so currencies sometimes make cross-border flows dangerous. Switzerland and Denmark have both suffered from their commitment to their own currencies this year. The ability to devalue is nice, but it’s illusory, to a large extent: It helps balance a budget, bring down debt levels and make exports more competitive, but it hits ordinary people with high inflation. Besides, according to a 2010 paper by Stephen Kamin, director of international finance at the Federal Reserve System,
The crisis has also identified an area in which the standard array of central bank tools may have become inadequate in many countries: liquidity provision and the lender-of-last resort function. With the rise in the share of financial transactions undertaken in vehicle currencies such as dollars and euros, the ability to print domestic currency may no longer suffice to address a liquidity crisis. Accordingly, international arrangements for liquidity provision may become increasingly important in the future.
In short, by giving up the right to print their own money, governments stand to lose less and less. And they might even need the discipline imposed by an outside monetary policy aithority. A country dependent on a single natural resource — say, oil — is tempted to spend when the price of that resource is high; knowing that devaluation will be unavailable when it falls will make such a country accumulate windfall revenues in a rainy-day fund instead.
If the world used the same currency, the problems inadvertently caused by the euro wouldn’t be replicated. German banks were too willing to lend to projects in the European periphery because they felt they could trust members of the same exclusive currency club and because the euro made investing in Europe almost frictionless, an advantage the rest of the world didn’t have. The one world, one currency club would make friction disappear.
Of course, there would be the question of who should administer the global central bank. The U.S. would want to — the dollar is as close to a global currency as we have — but resistance from other global players would sink the project. This is where something like Bitcoin could come in handy: a decentralized system that works with little human intervention. “Mining” rules could be established to prevent anyone from cornering the market, but the system would self-regulate.
This is naive utopianism, of course. The obstacles to such a project are beyond estimation, as so is the technical complexity. But this pipe-dream is a reminder of how tough and complex the euro project is. Those who hasten to write it off as a failure don’t show it enough respect. Sure, there have been setbacks, and some countries may prove unable to keep taking part, but its participants are accumulating data that may one day allow us to figure out how to bring the whole world closer together.